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Recent Developments 
SERIO v. BALTIMORE COUNTY: 
Felons Retain a Property Interest in Seized Firearms Even Though 
They Are Not Allowed to Possess Them 
By: Patricia Mitchell 
In Serio v. Baltimore County, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that felons who have had firearms seized by the police 
retain a property interest in the firearms even though they are not 
allowed to possess them. Serio v. Bait. County, 384 Md. 373, 377, 863 
A.2d 952, 954 (2004). The Court applied Article 24 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights in holding that the petitioner was entitled to due 
process protection against the wrongful retention of his property. !d. 
at 393-94, 863 A.2d at 964-65. The firearms were not contraband per 
se and the petitioner had not been convicted of possession of the 
firearms, so Baltimore County had no right to retain them without 
compensating the owner. !d. at 400, 863 A.2d at 968. 
In the fall of 1998, Robert Serio ("Serio") drove his car into a 
guardrail, causing it to flip upside down. The passenger riding with 
Serio was thrown from the car and died. In June 1999, the trial court 
sentenced Serio to six months of incarceration after he pled guilty to 
the felony of manslaughter by automobile. 
On the day of Serio's sentencing, Baltimore County police 
officers applied for a warrant to search Serio's house and seize "any 
firearms and any ammunition, boxes, receipts, or manuals relating to 
said firearms" that they found. Based on information from Serio's 
estranged wife and a search of the Maryland Automated Firearms 
System, the police alleged that Serio was a felon in possession of 
firearms in violation of Maryland law. After obtaining a warrant, 
Baltimore County police officers seized a number of firearms from 
Serio's home. Baltimore County later refused to return the seized 
firearms to Serio, even though he was never charged with the crime of 
illegally possessing firearms. The county also refused to give the 
firearms to a designee or sell the weapons and give Serio the proceeds 
from the sale. 
In July 1999, Serio filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
County against the county and one of the officers who affected the 
search and seizure of the firearms. His complaint challenged the 
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seizure of the weapons and sought their return; requested damages for 
any harm done to the seized firearms; and alleged misconduct on the 
part of the officer in obtaining and executing the search warrant. The 
county and officer filed a joint motion to dismiss, which was granted 
in November 1999. Four years of amended complaints and subsequent 
motions to dismiss followed. 
In 2003, all the complaints had been disposed of through 
summary judgment, and Serio's appeal made it to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland. The intermediate appellate court upheld the 
lower court's decision. Serio appealed to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, which granted certiorari. 
The Court reviewed the case de novo and began its analysis by 
boiling four years of litigation into a simple statement of each side's 
position. !d. at 388-91, 863 A.2d at 961-62. Serio asserted that § 
551(c) of Article 27 of the Maryland Code gave him a property interest 
in the firearms; that Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
gave him the right to due process; and that the lower courts erred by 
relying on precedent from the Eighth Circuit instead of on Maryland 
common law regarding forfeiture. !d. The county, on the other hand, 
maintained that the firearms were legally seized pursuant to a search 
warrant; properly withheld from Serio because of his status as a 
convicted felon; and not subject to restoration under § 551(c) of 
Article 27 of the Maryland Code. !d. at 389-90, 863 A.2d at 962. 
The Court next examined § 551(c)(l) of Article 27 of the 
Maryland Code to see if it applied. !d. The relevant section reads: "If, 
at any time, on application to a judge of the circuit court of any county 
or judge of the District Court, it is found that property rightfully taken 
under a search warrant is being wrongfully withheld after there is no 
further need for retention of the property, the judge must cause it to be 
restored to the person from whom it was taken." !d. 
Reviewing the plain language of the statute, the legislative 
intent underlying the statute, and the context in which the statute was 
written, the Court decided that the core of the issue was what the 
legislature meant by "restore." !d. Looking at all relevant authority, 
the Court determined that "restore" did not include returning property 
to a person via proxy. !d. Since Maryland law precluded Serio from 
personally taking repossession of his property,§ 551(c) did not apply 
to Serio's case. !d. 
This did not bar Serio from recovery, though. Serio's 
constitutional argument prevailed. !d. at 393-94, 863 A.2d at 964-65. 
As the Court explained, "[a]lthough Section 551(c) is inapplicable, 
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Serio did not lose his 'property' interest in the firearms because he is a 
convicted felon, and he retains due process protection against wrongful 
retention of his property under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights." !d. Citing persuasive cases from both the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits, the Court held that Serio retained a property right in the 
weapons and to deprive him of them without due process was illegal. 
!d. 
The basis of the due process violation was that the firearms 
were not contraband per se -- that is, inherently illegal -- but merely 
derivative contraband - that is, they became illegal by the fact that 
they were illegally possessed. Id. at 395, 863 A.2d at 965. Serio was 
never charged with the crime of illegally possessing the otherwise 
legal firearms. !d. at 395-97, 863 A.2d at 965-66. He never had his 
day in court to decide whether a crime was committed. Id. The Court 
concluded that it was a due process violation to seize and retain 
property that was not judicially determined to be part of a crime. Id. 
Since the Court decided that Baltimore County could not retain Serio's 
firearms without giving him due process, it directed a reversal of the 
summary judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, finding 
in favor of Serio. !d. at 400, 863 A.2d at 968. 
In determining that felons who have had firearms seized by the 
police retain a property interest in the firearms even though they are 
not allowed to possess them, the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld 
one of the founding principles of American democracy: the state may 
not, without affording due process of law, seize a citizen's personal 
property. By applying this rule to even the extreme case of a felon 
who possesses firearms in violation of state law, the Court ensures that 
the protection of due process will apply to all. Certainly if a felon can 
rest assured that his illegally possessed weaponry is safe from 
capricious government seizure, so too can a law abiding citizen rest 
well knowing his home and belongings are safe from potentially 
overzealous governmental actions. 
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